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EXXON MOBIL CORP. v.
ALLAPATTAH SERVICES, INC.: (5-4)
IN DIVERSITY CASES, ONLY ONE
PLAINTIFF OR CLASS MEMBER
MUST SATISFY THE AMOUNT IN
CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT
BLAYRE BRITTON*

In two cases consolidated as Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Services, Inc., the Supreme Court explored the amount in controversy
1
requirement in cases with multiple plaintiffs. These cases resolved a
division between the Courts of Appeals over the proper
interpretation of 28 U.S.C § 1367.2
In 1991, a group of approximately 10,000 fuel dealers invoked 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a) diversity jurisdiction of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Florida to file a class-action suit
against Exxon Corporation.3 The dealers alleged that Exxon had
intentionally overcharged them for fuel.4 After a unanimous jury
verdict for the dealers, “the District Court certified the case for
interlocutory review asking if it had properly exercised § 1367
supplemental jurisdiction over claims of class members who did not
meet the jurisdictional minimum.”5 The Eleventh Circuit upheld
supplemental jurisdiction, holding that § 1367 authorized
supplemental jurisdiction over claims of class members who do not
meet the amount in controversy, provided that the district court had

* 2007 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005) (consolidated with
Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc.)
2. Id. at 2615.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.

DO NOT DELETE

30

12/30/2008 12:09:37 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

VOL. 1:29
6

original jurisdiction over the claims of at least one class member. This
view was consistent with those taken by the Fourth,7 the Sixth,8 and
the Seventh Circuits.9 The Fifth10 and the Ninth Circuits11 decided
similarly that unnamed class members need not meet the amount-incontroversy requirement, though those courts took no clear view on
named members.12
The First Circuit came to a different conclusion about the
interpretation of § 1367 in Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc.13 In 1999,
nine-year-old Beatriz Blanco-Ortega suffered severe injuries after
14
slicing her right pinky finger on a Star-Kist tuna can. She brought a
diversity action in the United States District Court for Puerto Rico.15
Her family members later joined under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 20, suing for medical expenses and emotional distress
damages.16 The District Court granted summary judgment to Star-Kist
after determining that no plaintiff could meet the amount-in17
controversy requirement. On appeal, the First Circuit reversed with
respect to the girl, but affirmed as to the family members.18 It stated
that § 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction only when the district
court has original jurisdiction and when every plaintiff meets the
amount-in-controversy requirement—if a single plaintiff fails to
satisfy this requirement, the court would not have supplemental

6. Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 333 F.3d 1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 2003).
7. Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 112 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that “the plain text of
§ 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction in diversity class actions”).
8. See Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir. 2004) (overruling Zahn and
holding that each class member need not meet the amount in controversy requirement).
9. See Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that “Section 1367(a) has changed the basic rule by authorizing pendent-party
jurisdiction, and that change affects Clark and Zahn equally”).
10. See Free v. Abbott Labs (In re Abbott Labs. Inc.), 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the district court had supplemental jurisdiction over class members that did not
meet the amount-in-controversy requirement).
11. See Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 943 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that 28
U.S.C § 1367 “provides supplemental jurisdiction over the jurisdictionally insufficient claims of
unnamed class members if the named plaintiffs in the action have claims that satisfy the
amount-in-controversy requirement”).
12. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2616 (2005).
13. See Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 124, 133 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding, in joinder
cases, that each plaintiff must meet the amount in controversy requirement).
14. Id. at 126.
15. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2616.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 124, 144 (1st Cir. 2004)
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19
20
21
jurisdiction. This view was shared by the Third, the Eighth, and the
22
Tenth Circuits. The Eighth and Tenth Circuits had further applied
this rule to class actions.23
The Supreme Court attempted to resolve this conflict previously
in Free v. Abbott Laboratories, but due to O’Connor’s absence the
Court divided 4-4 without opinion.24 This time, in a 5-4 opinion
authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that “where the other
elements of jurisdiction are present and at least one named plaintiff in
the action satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement, § 1367
does authorize supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of other
plaintiffs in the same Article III case or controversy”—regardless of
whether each individual plaintiff meets the jurisdictional-amount
25
requirement. As a result, the Eleventh Circuit’s Exxon decision was
affirmed, and the First Circuit’s Ortega decision was reversed and
remanded.26
In Clark v. Paul Gray Inc., a federal-question case decided prior to
the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the Supreme Court held that each
plaintiff must meet the amount-in-controversy requirement and the
claims of those who do not meet the requirement must be dismissed.27
In Zahn v. International Paper Co., this requirement was extended to
class-action suits in which 18 U.S.C. § 1332(a) diversity jurisdiction
was invoked.28 In 1989, the Court held in Finley v. United States that a
district court could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction when a
plaintiff added related claims against other defendants, prohibiting so-

19. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2616.
20. See Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1999)
(concluding “that a plaintiff with claims less than the jurisdictional amount may not invoke
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367”).
21. See Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 962 (8th Cir. 2000) (requiring “each plaintiff
in a class action diversity case to satisfy the Zahn definition of ‘matter in controversy’ and to
individually meet the $75,000 requirement”).
22. See Leonhardt v. Western Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631, 632 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding “that
plaintiffs in a diversity class action must each satisfy that jurisdictional amount”).
23. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2616.
24. Free v. Abbott Labs., 529 U.S. 333 (2000); Posting of Brian Fletcher, to SCOTUSblog,
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2005/06/todays_opinion_2.html (June 23,
2005, 13:01 EST).
25. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2615.
26. Id.
27. Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 590 (1939).
28. Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973).
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29
called “pendent-party” jurisdiction. Just months later, Congress
enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a):
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include
30
claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
All parties in the consolidated cases agreed that § 1367 overruled
Finley; yet the debate in these cases centered on whether Congress,
31
when enacting this statute, also overruled Clark and Zahn. Because §
1367 clearly allows supplemental jurisdiction once the court has
original jurisdiction over a civil action, the critical question was
“whether a diversity case in which the claims of some plaintiffs satisfy
the amount-in-controversy requirement, but the claims of others
plaintiffs do not, presents a ‘civil action of which the district courts
have original jurisdiction.’”32
The majority answered this question in the affirmative by first
asserting that, assuming all other requirements were met, if one claim
were to satisfy the amount-in-controversy, the district court would
33
have original jurisdiction over that claim. Under § 1367(a), original
jurisdiction over a single claim leads to original jurisdiction over the
civil action. Once a court has original jurisdiction over the action, it
can exercise supplementary jurisdiction over additional claims,
including those involving joinder or intervention of additional parties.
Because nothing in § 1367(b) specifically withheld supplemental
jurisdiction over claims of plaintiffs joined by Rule 20 (as in Ortega)
or by Rule 23 (as in Exxon) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
both district courts could have exercised supplemental jurisdiction.34
The majority agreed with Allapattah,35 Ortega,36 and the

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989).
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000).
Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2631 (5-4 decision) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2620 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2620–21.
Id. at 2621.
Brief of Respondents at 17, Exxon, 125 S. Ct. 2611 (No. 04-70).
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37
Government. The majority contended that the plain language of the
statute required this result.38 It could not accept the alternative view,
held by the other parties, that original jurisdiction over a civil action
39
required original jurisdiction over every claim in a complaint.
The majority dismissed the indivisibility theory, which holds that
40
all claims “must stand or fall as a single, indivisible ‘civil action,’” by
41
asserting that the theory conflicts with supplemental jurisdiction.
According to the majority, the indivisibility theory is also inconsistent
with the practice of allowing courts to dismiss only the parties that do
not meet the jurisdiction requirements, rather than requiring them to
dismiss the entire action. If the claims were indivisible, all would have
to be dismissed.42 Additionally, this would require assigning a different
meaning to the same language, “original jurisdiction” and “civil
actions,” in 18 U.S.C. § 1331 federal question jurisdiction and 18 U.S.C.
§ 1332 diversity jurisdiction.43
The majority also rejected the contamination theory, under which
the inclusion of a claim or a party outside of original jurisdiction
deprives the court of original jurisdiction over all other claims.44 This
theory is compatible with the complete diversity requirement because
the potential state bias for all claims is eliminated by the presence of a
non-diverse party, and hence the need for federal jurisdiction
45
disappears. However, the majority maintained that it is incompatible
with the amount-in-controversy requirement, which exists to assure
that a dispute is sufficiently important to be heard in a federal venue;
the presence of another party does not eliminate the importance of
the dispute.46 Thus, the mere fact that both requirements are found in
§ 1332 does not preclude the contamination theory from applying to
47
both.

36. Brief for Petitioners at 19, Exxon, 125 S. Ct. 2611 (No. 04-79).
37. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7, Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (No. 04-70).
38. Exxon, 125 S. Ct. at 2625.
39. Id. at 2621.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2621–22.
42. Id. at 2622.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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Justice Ginsburg, in a dissent joined by Justices Stevens,
O’Connor, and Breyer, argued that the statute was open to a “less
48
disruptive” and more compelling interpretation. The dissent argued
that the phrase in § 1367(a), “any civil action of which the district
49
courts have original jurisdiction,” should be read, in diversity cases,
“to incorporate the rules on joinder and aggregation tightly tied to §
50
1332 at time of § 1367’s enactment.” Thus, original jurisdiction can
only be present if the complaint first meets the requirements of §
1332, which incorporates the complete diversity rule and the decisions
51
in Clark and Zahn. This interpretation, the dissent asserted, would
explain why § 1367(b), which excluded certain claims from the grant
of supplemental jurisdiction found in § 1367(a), did not include Rule
20 plaintiffs or Rule 23 class actions. Congress did not need to exclude
them because they were never included in § 1367(a).52 An additional
virtue of this interpretation, in the dissent’s view, was that it preserved
the judicially developed distinctions between pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction.53 The dissent argued further that its interpretation
accorded better “with the historical and legal context of Congress’[s]
54
enactment” of § 1367, and it asserted that close questions of
statutory construction should be resolved against change.55
The majority, however, found no need to consult such interpretive
tools as the legislative history of the statute because, in its view, § 1367
56
was not ambiguous. Furthermore, the majority argued, if it were
appropriate to examine the legislative history, such evidence would
not alter its view because, in this case and often in general, the
legislative history was both murky and contentious.57 This assertion
fueled Justice Stevens’s dissent, in which he contended that the
legislative history explicitly stated that § 1367 was intended merely to
overrule Finley, and specifically to avoid overruling Zahn.58 Justice
Stevens found the majority’s reasons for not consulting the
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 2632 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000).
Exxon, 125 S. Ct at 2638 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2639.
Id. at 2638–39.
Id. at 2640–41.
Id. at 2641.
Id. at 2626–27 (majority opinion)
Id.
Id. at 2629 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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59
“uncommonly clear” legislative history unpersuasive. Justice Stevens
further warned that it was “unwise to treat the ambiguity vel non of a
statute as determinative of whether legislative history is consulted,”60
because, as Justice Ginsburg’s dissent showed, ambiguity is “in the eye
61
of the beholder.”
Both Exxon and Allapattah claimed that the 2005 enactment of
62
the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) should alter the Court’s
analysis. Subject to certain requirements, CAFA granted district
courts original jurisdiction over any class action in which the
aggregate amount-in-controversy exceeded five million dollars and in
which at least partial diversity existed.63 CAFA, according to Exxon,
demonstrated that if Congress were to amend § 1332, it would do so
64
explicitly. Allapattah claimed that the passage of CAFA undermined
Exxon’s appeal because the CAFA contradicted Exxon’s claim that
Congress was opposed to diversity jurisdiction in class-action suits.65
Further, Allapattah claimed that even if jurisdiction was found to be
66
improper, the case could merely be refiled under CAFA. Despite
these arguments, the majority concluded the opinion by asserting that
67
CAFA in no way impacted the Court’s analysis.
Although the extent of jurisdiction allowed under § 1367 has been
68
in controversy since its enactment, Allapattah may be correct in
asserting that, in light of CAFA, the practical impact of this ruling is
limited in the class action context: “Congress found that the
determination of six of the courts of appeal that § 1367 had overruled
Zahn had not materially impacted the filing or removal of diversity
class actions in federal court.”69 The expansion of federal diversity

59. Id. at 2630–31.
60. Id. at 2628.
61. Id.
62. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2005).
64. See Supplemental Brief of Exxon Corp. at 3, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,
Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005) (No. 04-70) (noting that “[w]hen Congress wants to alter
dramatically the scope of diversity jurisdiction, it does so directly and unequivocally”).
65. Respondents’ Supplemental Merits Brief at 1, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,
Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005) (No. 04-70).
66. Id. at 2
67. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2627–28 (2005).
68. See generally Mark Hutcheson, Comment, Unintended Consequences: 28 U.S.C. 1367’s
Effect on Diversity’s Amount in Controversy Requirement, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 247 (1996).
69. Respondents’ Supplemental Merits Brief, supra note 65, at 3 (citing S. Rep. No. 108123, at n.22–40 (2003)).
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jurisdiction is seen as beneficial primarily to corporations, which often
prefer federal courts over state courts because of the perceived state
70
bias. However, the cases of particular concern to corporations—class
actions with large damages—would already be covered by CAFA.
Even if caseloads were to increase slightly, it may be worth it, as the
overruling of Clark and Zahn can be seen as fostering “the efficient
71
resolution of complex litigation.”
Nonetheless, given the split among the Courts of Appeals and the
longstanding debate, the majority may have reached the wrong
interpretation. If this result were truly outside of Congress’s intent, a
Finley-type congressional fix would be expected. Given the enactment
of CAFA, demonstrating Congress’s willingness to expand diversity
jurisdiction, and the limited effect that the overruling of Zahn is seen
to have, this fix appears unlikely.

70. See generally Victor E. Flango, Litigant Choice Between State and Federal Courts, 46
S.C. L. REV. 961, 967 (1995).
71. Mark C. Cawley, Note, The Right Result for the Wrong Reasons: Permitting
Aggregation of Claims Under 28 U.S.C. 1367 in Multi-Plaintiff Diversity Litigation, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1045, 1076 (1998).

